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PUBLIC PURPOSE IN TAXATION AND
EMINENT DOMAIN
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
To establish and maintain public schools always has been
a prominent object of the government. From the very first it
has provided some means for public education. It is sufficient
to allude to the earliest territorial legislation in regard to educa-
tion and to the donation of lands by Congress for this purpose as
preliminary to what the states have done in this respect. In
fact several of the constitutions require the legislature to
establish and maintain educational systems. Therefore, when
the right to exercise the power of eminent domain or taxation
for educational purposes has been questioned the case has usually
related to the extent of the power provided for in the constitu-
tion and not to the existence of the right or duty to invoke it.
1. Common Public Slool&.-State and Local.
In accordance with a section of the constitution of Penn-
sylvania which required the legislature to provide by law for
the establishment of schools, in such manner that "the poor shall
be taught gratis," the supreme court of that state decided that
the legislature could lawfully establish a sufficient number of
public schools for the education of every individual between the
ages of five and twenty-one years.' The schools, when estab-
lished, were made available to every one between these ages, who
applied for admission and instruction. It was contended that
the last clause of the section'of the constitution was a limitation
on the power of the legislature and that no law could be held
constitutional which had for its purpose any other object than
that of teaching the poor gratis. The court laid stress upon a
liberal interpretation of the constitution and declared that:
"The error consists in supposing this to define the maximum of
the legislature's power. While in truth it only fixes the minimum.
It enjoins them to do this much, but does not forbid them to do more.
If they stop short of that point they fail in their duty; but it does
not result that they have no power to go beyond it."
Local schools are not only declared to be a public purpose
but local governments may be required to establish and main-
1 Commonwealth v. Hartmen, (1857) 17 Pa. St. 118.
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tain them. The legislature of Maryland enacted a law which
required the authorities of a city of that state to issue bonds to
raise money for the construction of a public school building
without the consent of the qualified voters. The statute was
sustained in Revell v. City of Annapolis.2 In this case it was
contended that the legislature was not competent to compel a
municipal corporation to create a debt or levy a tax for a local
purpose in which the state has no interest. That is, it was con-
tended that the state had no concern in the construction of local
schools and therefore their construction was not a public pur-
pose. But since the legislature had established a system of
public schools and provided for their maintenance the court
held that they were for a public object within the meaning of
the ordinary functions of municipal government. Having in
mind that a municipal corporation is a subordinate part of the
state government, Chief Justice Robinson said in delivering the
opinion of the court:
"It is well settled in this state that the legislature has the power
to compel a municipal corporation to incur a debt for a public purpose
and one within the ordinary functions of government. * * * Public
schools being a public object * * * there is no ground on which
the exercise of this power can be denied."
In establishing an educational system, a city is not limited
to making provisions for the ordinary common schools. A
Wisconsin case3 holds that bonds issued by a city for the erec-
tion and maintenance of a manual training school in and for a
city to be for a public purpose. The bonds were issued to sup-
plement funds which had been provided by a testamentary gift
made under such circumstances as to create a trust made in
perpetuity. It was intended that the building for the school
should be built as a memorial to the donor. In spite of the fact
that had it not been for the gift, probably no money would have
been raised; and that the city became permanently obligated to
maintain the school, the court held that the city had a right to
vote bonds to maintain a public school system and teach manual
training as a part of its general system of education.
A very interesting case involving taxes for school purposes
2(1895) 81 Md. 1, 31 Atl. 695. But in Lovern v. School Dist.,
(1886) 64 N. H. 616, 6 Atl. 483, a bill to compel the selectmen to assess
a tax in a school district to build a school house on a lot which was
not public property was not sustained.3 Maxey v. City of Oshkosh, (1910) 144 Wis. 238, 128 N. W. 899.
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is that of Town Council of Cranston.4 A town voted to abandon
the school district and to adopt the town school system. There-
upon the title to all of the school property owned by the school
district was vested in the town, subject to an appraisal to be
made by a commission to be appointed for that purpose. A
statute provided' that at the next annual assessment of taxes,
a tax should be levied upon the whole town equal to the amount
of the appraisal; and there should be remitted to the taxpayers
of each district their proportional share of the appraised value
of the school property in the district. In answer to the argument
that the statute provided for a tax for other than a public
purpose, the court replied that school districts have been
recognized as quasi public corporations and are respectfully the
owners of their school property. Under the act these were to
become the property of the town. All the taxpayers would be
liable to pay for school houses built or purchased by the town,
and as members of the school district the act recognized that
some payment should be made by the town for the property
taken from the districts. The payment of money under these
circumstances is not compensation in the strict sense of the term
as where private property is taken although it resembles that.
The court maintained that it was rather an attempted equaliza-
tion as between the taxpayers of the town, as members of a
corporation, and the taxpayers of the district as members of
another corporation. The court failed to concede that the
adjustment of debit and credit was not fair, reasonable and for
a public purpose, and upheld the statute which levied the tax.
Not only may the inhabitants of a town be taxed to defray
the expenses of changing from a district to a town school system,
but non-resident corporations may be taxed to maintain the
public schools of the state located in a county, which are not
confined to any one class of persons but open to the general
public. Therefore an annual levy on the taxable property of a
railroad located within a county for the support of public
schools is for a public purpose. Such a tax was upheld in the
Soitdhern R. R. Co. v. St. Clair County case.5 An objection to
the right to levy the tax was based on the argument that the
tax was not for the maintenance of the public schools of the
state, and that non-resident corporations or citizens owning
(1893) 18 R. I. 417.
(1899) 124 Ala. 491, 27 So. 23.
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property in the county have no direct interest in the better
maintenance of the schools and ought not to be taxed for their
support. The court took the view that state and local taxation
are often closely interwoven, and that occurs most often in
matters pertaining to the subject of education and schools. For
the purpose of supporting schools the court showed that the two
subjects, state and local taxation, "are allied because there is
mutuality of duty, purpose and benefit," and where such condi-
tions exist state taxation for a public purpose will be supported
by local taxation.
In answering the objection that the property of non-resident
corporations should not be taxed, the court said: "They have
property to protect and greater security results from the moral,
intellectual, and social improvement by which the property is
surrounded." Thus this case holds that non-resident corpora-
tions having property within a county can be taxed for the
support of schools on the ground that the schools are maintained
for a public purpose.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain has been
sustained to establish and maintain public schools.6 For example
it has been decided in Vermont that land taken for a school
house site is a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain
for a public use. The case involving this point is that of
Williams v. School District,7 in which it was alleged that the
I See for example: Williams v. School District, (1860) 33 Vt. 271;
Township Board of Education v. Hackman, (1871) 48 Mo. 243; Graded
School Trustee v. Hinton, (1914) 165 N. C. 12, 80 S. E. 890; Board of
Education v. Harper, (1918) 191 N. Y. S. 274; Commonwealth v. Clear-
view Coal Co., (1917) 256 Pa. St. 328, 100 Atl. 820.
(1860) 33 Vt. 271. A similar statute was declared unconstitu-
tional by the supreme court of Va. See, School Board of the City of
Harrisonburg v. Alexander, (1919) 101 S. E. 349. The particular point
involved in this case was the taking of a lot which contained a resi-
dence, yard and garden, the invasion of which was expressly forbidden
by the statute. While the statute was declared unconstitutional the
court held that property taken for school purposes is for a public
purpose.
That property taken for the use of schools is to be considered a
public use is also the view of a number of state courts. For example,
in Township Board of Education v. Hackman, (1871) 48 Mo. 243, the
court adopted the opinion in Williams v. School District, (1860) 33 Vt.
271 and upheld the taking of property for local schools. This principle
is in accord with the provisions of the constitution of N. C. which
says "schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged"
because knowledge is "necessary to good government and the happiness
of mankind" and which requires the General Assembly to "provide
by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of public
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purpose was too limited and local in its character, and benefited
so small a portion of the community that the legislature could
not exercise the power of eminent domain in its favor; that in
order to sustain the power of eminent domain it must be for
some purpose that may be enjoyed by the entire community.
The court in answering the objections made a very forceful
statement saying:
"Every public use, is to some extent local and benefits a particular
section more than another. * * * But the use in the present case has
a more enlarged and liberal view. It is a benefit and advantage to
the whole country that all the children should be educated and thus
any means of educating the children in a single district benefits the
whole. To accomplish this great object of educating the whole, it
becomes necessary to make them accessible to all; but the principle
remains the same as if all the children in the state attend a single
school. They are but separate means to accomplish the same great
and general benefit. The maintenance and support of common schools
have ever been regarded in this state as not only a public usefulness
but of public necessity, and one which the state in. its sovereign char-
acter was bound to sustain. It would be hard to require school dis-
tricts by law to erect school houses and support schools and not place
within their reach the legal power to enable them to comply with the
legal requirement."
It will be noticed that in the opinion primary emphasis is
placed upon the relation of the local schools to the entire county
and the necessity of the power of eminent domain to carry into
full effect the legal duty of establishing and maintaining them.
There is also discernable the elements of benefit upon which the
decision turned.
A number of other cases have arisen in which the question
of the validity of condemnation proceedings for school house
sites were presented to the court. The exercise of the power
of eminent domain under authority of a school law which author-
ized the purchase of real estate upon which to erect school
houses, but gave no power to take the land by condemnation
proceedings, was sustained by the supreme court of Pennsyl-
vania.8 The common school system pervades the whole state.
For that reason the court said the school system is its creation,
acting in the several districts by its board of directors, who are
simply the agents of the state carrying out the wise, benevolent
and far sighted policy of the government. Every man, woman
schools" for the children of the state. Graded SchooZ Trustee v.
Hinton, (1914) 165 N. C. 12, 80 S. E. 890. It also seems to be a well
settled rule of law in Georgia decided in a recent case. Sheppard v.
City of Edision, (1926) 132 S. E. 218.
"FuUer v. Long, (1871) 68 Pa. St. 170.
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and child in the commonwealth should be able to read and write,
and this is the object aimed at by the common school law. School
houses are an essential part of the system and the compulsory
power is as necessary to it as the taking of property for a high-
way. In both cases the uses are public. The state proceeds in
both cases are adequate funds for adequate compensation and
security for compensation for damages by a pledge of the funds
raised by taxation.
In accordance with the doctrine that land taken for a
school house site is a public use, it has been held that property
may be taken for this purpose by a school district organized
by a special act of the legislature instead of under the general
school law.9 However, the district had been recognized by the
state department of education as a union free district and it had
complied with the requirements of the school law. The fact that
some part of the premises was to be used for training the school
children under the state military training commission did not
effect the question of public use.
It is also true that ample grounds are quite as essential for
the exercise and recreation of the school children as for the con-
struction of a school house. In the Independent School District
v. Hewett case'0 a tax was voted to purchase a lot after the
school house had been built. The land which appeared to have
been taken for a playground for the children was adjacent to
the school house. The owner of the property refused to sell the
property for the alleged reason that the evidence did not
establish the necessity for it. On the ground that the lot was
for the convenient use of the school, the court sustained the
condemnation proceedings. The fact that the lot was not for
an original site Justice Ladd said "furnishes no objection to
the appropriation." It was said in a more recent case, in which
this same subject was considered: "The meaning of the word
'site' is broad enough to embrace such land not exceeding the
statutory limits as may reasonably be required for the suitable
and convenient use of the particular building; and land taken
for a playground in conjunction with a school may be as
essential as land taken for the school house itself.""1 The land
involved in this case was for the benefit of a high school. The
9 Board of Ed ucation v. Harper, (1918) 191 N. Y. S. 273.
10 (1898) 105 Iowa 663, 75 N. W. 497.
"'Board of Education v. Forrest, (1925) 130 S. E. 621. (N. C.)
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building had been constructed before the condemnation pro-
ceedings were instituted to take the land for the entrance and
playground.
The cases in regard to the exercise of the power of eminent
domain thus far considered have involved school building sites
and school grounds. But it happens that the power of eminent
domain has been used for other things. The underlying coal
which may be necessary to support a school building may be con-
demned by a school district. The rule governing this situation
was expressed by the supreme court of Pennsylvania in a fairly
recent case. 12 When the school idstrict purchased the land for
a school house site it expressly waived the right of all surface
support and erected its building where the title to all the coal
and the right to remove it was vested in another. At an enormous
expense the coal company sank a shaft and made all necessary
preparations to carry on mining operations which it proceeded
to do without providing adequate surface supports. The use
of the school building was abandoned and the pupils were sent
to other schools which resulted in overcrowding and reduced
school efficiency. The citizens and taxpayers of the school dis-
trict sought to prevent the mining of the coal on the ground that
it constituted a public nuisance. The court recognized the fact
"that the mining of coal is lawful; and when as in this case
the right to surface support is expressly waived, it is lawful to
mine all of the coal." The court was confronted with the
difficult task of preventing the doing of a lawful act in a lawful
manner by declaring it a public nuisance. Chief Justice Walling
stated that for practical purposes, the right to coal consists in
the right to mine it. Where, as in this case, the right to surface
right is expressly waived, it is lawful to remove all of the coal.
"An order of the court that the coal or any part of it must
remain permanently unmined as a support to the school building
practically takes such coal from the company and vests it in
the school district, without compensation, which the constitu-
tion forbids." It was finally held, however, that coal is real
estate subject to the power of eminent domain and that the
school district could exercise the power for the protection of
school buildings. The court said: "It is only in rare cases of
overwhelming necessity that private property may be taken or
12Commonwealth v. Olearview Coal Co., (1917) 256 Pa. St. 328, 100
At. 820.
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destroyed for the public. * * * The primary obligation of
furnishing adequate school buildings rests upon the school dis-
trict and if any be found without surface support * * * the
district must under existing laws supply the deficiency by con-
demnation. "
2. Problems Arising out of Consolidated Schools.
One of the problems which confronts school officials due to
the consolidated school movement is the transportation of pupils.
It is now settled that the transportation of pupils to and from
school is a legitimate expense of operating a public school system.
This principle of law was laid down in Bafkin v. MitchellI in
which it was contended that the transportation of pupils was a
diversion of school funds raised by taxation to a purpose not
authorized by law. Most courts would undoubtedly agree with
Justice Reed when he said:
"If the establishment of these consolidated schools in rural districts
is as claimed for the general improvement in the system as it operates
throughout the state, and provides superior advantages and opportuni-
ties for the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural
knowledge and training, then we cannot see that there is any improper
diversion of the school funds to apply a necessary portion thereof in
transporting pupils residing outside of a certain distance to the school
so that such consolidated and improved school may be maintained.
We can readily see that the organization of such consolidated districts
may result in the saving of expenses in conducting the school in the
rural communities through centralization and unified work."
3. Education for Colored Children.
In several of the states it is expressly prohibited by law
to make any distinction in regard to the rights of colored
children to attend the same schools with others when the law
makes equal provisions for them. And in Nevada the Supreme
Court of that state held that where the law contemplates
separate schools, colored children may attend the regular schools
if no others are provided.' 4 In fact a mandamus was granted
to compel the admission of a colored pupil to the public schools,
for the reason that certain funds were pledged and certain taxes
were allowed for the support of common schools which were
public and open to be used by all. But on the other hand, the
court stated that "It is perfectly within their power to send
all blacks to one school and all whites to another * * to make
13 (1913) 106 Miss. 253, 63 So. 458.
14 State v. Duffy, (1872) 7 Nev. 342.
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such classification whether based on age, sex or race or any other
existent condition as may seem to them best.' " 5
However there is some diversity of opinion on this subject.
A North Carolina case holds that a statute requiring a tax on
polls and property of colored persons to be applied exclusively
to the education of their children is an unlawful discrimination
to the prejudice of either race.16 In another case from a dif-
ferent jurisdiction a law was upheld which provided for devot-
ing school taxes collected from colored people for the support
of schools used exclusively for colored children. 7 And accord-
ing to the decision in this case colored people cannot be taxed
exclusively for white schools. When in Marslll v. Donovan's
the sheriff seized and sold property to satisfy a tax claim against
an individual for the benefit of the schools in the county, he
objected to the paying of the tax for the alleged reason that the
negro did not participate in the profits arising from the school
fund and in the educational advantages afforded by the common
school system. But the court said: "Whatever may be the
duty of the state to the negro in regard to providing for the
education of his children, it is one which devolves upon the
legislature and in the discharge of that duty that department
of government has the power, by imposing taxes upon his prop-
erty and by establishing schools for the benefit of his children,
to equalize the burdens and benefits of the two races. So far
as the matter of education is concerned, steps have been taken
to establish and maintain separate schools for the colored
children. "
4. Pensions for SchooZ Teachers.
"Under a broad interpretation of the constitutional pro-
vision of promoting the general welfare, Congress can provide
pensions for the school teachers of our land, because the encour-
agement of education is a public purpose inextricably connected
with the general welfare policies of our nation and state."' 19
15 This view is held in Ward v. Flood, (1874) 38 Cal. 36; Cory v.
Carter, (1874) 48 Ind. 327; State v. MeMann, (1871) 21 Ohio St. 198.
' Riggsbee v. Durham, (1886) 94 N. C. 800; Puitt v. Gaston County
Commissioners, (1886) 94 N. C. 709.
11Marshall v. Donovan, (1874) 10 Bush. (Ky.) 681; Claybroke v.
Owensboro, (1883) 16 Fed. Rep. 297.
" (1S74) 10 Bush. (Ky.) 681.
" Hall v. United States, (1878) 98 U. S. 343, 25 L. Ed. 180. Justice
Robinson dissented on the ground that it was class legislation "* * *
a gift or donation which is not for a public purpose."
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Accordingly the exercise of the taxing power to establish
a teacher's pension fund is regarded as a public purpose in
North Dakota. 20 The statute before the supreme court of that
state did not levy a tax directly. The county treasurer was
required to set aside from the tuition fund a sum equal to ten
cents for each child of school age. A small amount was to be
retained out of the wages paid to the teachers to enlarge the
fund. The court regarded the pension in the nature of an added
salary allowance to increase the efficiency of the teachers them-
selves and encourage them to devote their lives to a profession
"which though essential to our civilization has been poorly
encouraged and has been too often looked upon merely as a
stepping stone to other employment." For this reason the fund
was held to be germane to the general school purposes. But a
similar statute was declared unconstitutional in Ohio as taking
private property from one citizen for the benefit of another. 21
5. Special Kind of Taz for School Purposes.
The increase in the cost of maintaining schools, due to the
public demand for the establishment of better educational
facilities, has led some states to impose special kinds of taxes.
An additional tax rate imposed upon a particular class of income
by the legislature of Massachusetts is an example. The revenue
derived from this source was required to be turned over to the
several cities and towns in the state to reimburse them for certain
expenditures for the support of public schools. Because popular
education is a public purpose it was declared that the income
tax was a "simple case of additional revenue, levied to meet
the additional general expenses of government which is
indubitable. ' "22 The records do not show another case of an
income tax levied for the specific purpose of school support.
But an inheritance tax levied for the purpose of defraying the
expenses at the state university of students without means, who
should be awarded scholarships of merits by a competitive exami-
nation was held to be unconstitutional by the Missouri court as
levying a tax for private persons and not for a public purpose.
2 3
The same court declared a statute unconstitutional which pro-
vided that every manufacturer of patent medicines in the state
"0State v. Hange, (1917) 37 N. D. 583.
"Hibbard v. State, (1901) 64 N. E. 109.
"Mr. Bell furnished no citation for this quotation. Ed.
2"State v. Switzer, (1898) 143 Mo. 287, 45 S. E. 245.
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shall pay a license fee to be used for maintaining free scholar-
ships in the state university to aid students without means,
because it was levied for a special class of students of the uni-
versity and did not benefit the public.24 A license fee is usually
distinguished from a tax. But they are closely allied and it is
not unreasonable to suppose that if a court declares the purpose
for which a license fee was charged not to be a public one, it
would take the same attitude toward a general tax levied for the
same purpose. If it is not a public purpose for the ones. it is
not for the other.
6. High Schools and Other Institutions of Higher Learning.
The use of the powers of taxation and eminent domain have
not been limited to the common schools. These two govern-
mental powers have been exercised successfully for the benefit
of high schools and other institutions of higher learning. These
educational institutions have been liberally supported by taxa-
tion, and the right of eminent domain has been invoked on
numerous occasions for their benefit. It is such a well established
principle of constitutional law that only a few cases have been
in litigation.
The general question of the authority of the state to make
high schools free, confronted the court of last resort in Michigan.
The court was asked to restrain the collection of school taxes
which had been voted for the support of high schools and to
make free the instruction of children in the modern languages.
The comlainants in the suit argued that the instruction in the
classics and in the modern languages was not for the benefit of
the people at large but rather for the accomplishment of the
few, and therefore the court ought to declare it incompetent for
the state to supply it wholly at public expense. But after a very
comprehensive review of the educational policy of the state the
court sustained the collection of the tax, declaring it to be for
a public purpose.2 5
The authority of the state to support an agricmItural and
mechanical college by a general tax levied annually was chal-
"Simmons Medicine Company v. Ziegenheim, (1898) 145 Mo. 386,
47 S. W. 10.
mStuart v. School District of Kalamazoo, (1874) 30 Mich. 69.
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lenged and sustained in Higgins v. Prater.26 The college was
non-sectarian, and its aim was to furnish at a cheap rate of
tuition, a practical and liberal education to the rich and poor
alike-a place where the masses of people could prepare them-
selves for proper citizenship. Regardless of these aims it was
contended in argument that the state could not constitutionally
aid by taxation any educational institution whatever, other than
common schools. The decision turned on the interpretation of
the clause in the constitution relative to the school system. The
court concluded that the article of the constitution when all
of it was considered and especially in connection with its history
and the practical construction which had been given it, did not
forbid taxation by the state to aid an educational institution
other than common schools.
The public purpose for which taxes may be levied to support
higher institutions of learning also sustains the use of the power
of eminent domain. Therefore when the legislature deems it
necessary to secure land for the future growth and prosperity
of the state university upon which there can be erected build-
ings for its various activities, it may authorize the condemnation
of ample ground for the purpose.27 The legislature is not
required to act only for the present, but it has the power to
determine the future needs of the university with reference to
land and to provide in the present for that which it believes f a
be a future necessity. Therefore a condemnation proceeding is
not invalid because the legislature apparently makes provision
for the future growth and development of the university and
authorizes the acquisition of more land than is necessary to
satisfy its immediate need in this respect. The fact that a part
of the land acquired is leased to private persons for a private
purpose until it is put to use to meet the needs of the university
in no way changes its status. The property is still dedicated to
a public use, if the revenues derived from the rentals become
a part of the funds of the university.
It is not necessary for the land so acquired to be used for
university buildings. Condemnation proceedings have been
sustained to secure land on which a building was to be erected
(1890) 91 Ky. 6, 14 S. W. 910. The power of taxation was
granted to aid in the establishment of normal schools in Briggs v.
Johnson, (1877) 4 Dillion 148, and Ransom v. Rutherford County,
(1910) 123 Tenn. 28.
G1 Cochran v. Cavanaugh, (1923) 252 S. W. 284.
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with funds donated by an alumnus for the purpose of housing
a combined lawyers' club and dormitory to be used in connection
with the law school.28 All members of the law school were to
be eligible to membership in the club, and all dues and profits
from the operation of the building were to be used exclusively
for legal research. Justice Donald said in speaking for the
court:
"The claim that the property to be acquired is not for a public
use is so plainly without merit that we do not deem it necessary to
enter into any extended discussion of it."
In a case decided in Minnesota the exercise of the power of
eminent domain by the state to condemn a right of way for a
railway connecting the university farm with the campus and
with a street car system for the purpose of providing facilities
for the transportation of persons, supplies, and materials was
sustained.29 After reviewing the status of the university in the
educational system of the state, C. J. Taylor said:
"The University has been reorganized from time to time and its
scope and activities much extended; but it has always been recognized
as a public institution forming a part of the educational system of the
state and no attempt has ever been made to give it any other or dif-
ferent character. That the state may take property for the purpose of
enabling it conveniently to perform its governmental functions has
never been doubted. It may take such property for public schools
* * * * and for other public institutions established and conducted
by the state in its capacity as sovereign. The state in its governmental
capacity maintains and conducts the university as a part of its educa-
tional system, and may condemn for its use any property needed for
the purpose of providing the institution with proper and convenient
facilities for performing its work. The taking of property for such
purpose is a taking for public use."
7. To Secure the Location of Educational TNstitutions.
Several cases hold that the donation of money raised by the
issuing of bonds or taxation to secure the location o. educational
institutions is a valid public purpose.3 0 This view is adopted in
the decision of Marks v. Purdue University.3 1 The main ques-
mPeople v. Brooks, (1923) 194 N. W. 602.
"Knapp v. State, (1914) 125 Minn. 194, 145 N. W. 967.
31Marks v. Purdue, (1871) 37 Ind. 155. Other cases in which the
rule is found are: Burr v. Carbondale, (1875) 76 Ill. 455; Hensley
Township v. People, (1877) 84 Ill. 544; Livingston County v. Darling-
ton, (1879) 101 U. S. 407; Cox v. Pitt County, (1908) 156 N. C. 584,
60 S. E. 516, 16 L. R. A. (n. s.) 253; East Tenn. University v. Knoxville,
(1873) 6 Baxter 167.
1 (1871) 37 Ind 155. In 1869 the commissioners of Tippecanoe
county to secure the location of an agricultural college within the
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tion in the case was whether taxes could be assessed in a county
to liquidate a debt contracted by the county, in securing the
location of a state institution. The court answered the question
in the affirmative, on the ground that the taxes collected to dis-
charge the obligation was solely for a county purpose. While
the university is a state institution the court said:
"Every citizen will have an equal right, under the same circum-
stances to avail himself of its privileges, and the location of it in a
given county will, doubtless confer upon that county many local bene-
fits of pecuniary value. The parents of the county can send their sons
and perhaps their daughters to the college to be educated at a less
expenditure of time and money than would be incurred if it were
situated at a more remote point in the state. The college with its
professors, tutors, attendants and students will probably diffuse much
more money throughout the community than would otherwise circulate,
it may also add to the educated and intelligent population of the place
and be the means of stimulating the industry and increasing the wealth
and moral worth of the community thereby enhancing the attraction
of society and the value of property. Local taxation by counties and
cities are constantly upheld. There can be no possible doubt, on
general principles that the location of the college in Tippecanoe county
was a sufficient consideration to support the promise on the part of
the county."'
8. Private Educational Institutions.
The question whether educational institutions when owned
and controlled by a private corporation may constitutionally
be given the right to take private property upon paying a just
compensation apparently has been presented to no other court
than that of Connecticut.33 A decision of the supreme court
of that state declared that the higher education of women is in
county made a liberal donation of $30,000 for the purpose. An act of
the legislature was approved accepting the donation, locating the col-
lege in that county, and naming it the "Purdue University". The
purpose of the suit was by way of mandate to compel the payment of
a warrant issued for the first installment of the donation.
1 In Gordon v. Cornes, (1872) 47 N. Y. 608, the legislature of N. Y.
authorized a village to raise money by levying taxes and issuing bonds
to secure the location of a normal school for the education of teachers
for the common schools. This tax was sustained as a tax upon a
particular locality to aid in a public purpose.
The supreme court of Missouri in State v. Curator of the State
University, (1874) 57 Mo. 178 held bonds issued by a county and
donated to the curator of the state university to secure the location
in the county of a branch of the university unconstitutional and void
without the sanction of a % vote of the people.
Two cases in Illinois affirm such donations. In a suit to enjoin the
collection of taxes assessed to pay the interest on bonds issued by the
city of Carbondale, under authority of an act passed by the legislature
to secure the location of the Southern Normal University within the
city, the court sustained the collection of the taxes in question.
33Connecticut College for Women v. Calvert, (1913) 87 Conn. 421,
188 Atl. 633.
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its nature a public use in aid of which the right to exercise the
power of eminent domain may be granted to a private educa-
tional corporation, provided the public is given free and equal
right to enjoy the benefit of it. The college concerned in this
case was incorporated by the general assembly for the purpose
of providing such a public education. But the control and dis-
position of.its property and the management of its affairs were
vested in a board of trustees to be elected by the members of
the corporation. The admission of students to the institution,
the tuition fees to be paid, and the curriculum to be pursued
were at the direction of the trustees. Therefore the court said
in refusing to permit the college to acquire property by the
use of the power of eminent domain:
"The phrase 'higher education' is indefinite. The corporation has
already received large gifts and the expenses of its establishment and
maintenance will be provided in part at least, through voluntary con-
tributions. It, therefore, administers a public charity within the
meaning of the statute of charitable uses. But it is a matter of common
knowledge that there are many colleges for the higher education of
women in which the public have not and cannot acquire the right to
be educated. The proprietors of these cannot take land for such con-
tinued private use, by right of eminent domain. There is no allegation
in the petition that the public has or can acquire the right to enjoy
the benefits of the land sought to be taken, no provision to that effect
in the petitioner's charter, and the stated corporate purposes of the
obligation of admitting to its courses of instruction all qualified candi-
dates to the extent of its capacity without religious, racial or social
distinction. The necessary public benefit from the establishment of
the college does not entitle it to use the power of eminent domain
unless the public have a free and equal right to its benefits. In the
absence of showing that this is true the statute is unconstitutional."
Several cases involving taxation for the support of private
educational institutions have been decided in the state courts.
In every case except one taxation for this purpose has been
declared unconstitutional. This was the Hart v. Antrim4 case
in which a statute ,was upheld which authorized a town to raise
money by loan or taxation to erect a school building and to give
a perpetual lease of it, to a private academy corporation without
payment of rent to be used for public school purposes. The
taxpayers of the town asked for an injunction to prevent the
town from carrying the statute into effect on the ground that
it was taxation for a private purpose because the academy
corporation charged tuition. But the school was open to the
34 (1887) 64 N. H. 284, 9 At. 389.
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public, to all who paid the tuition, without any restriction. For
that reason the court held that the tax in question was for a
valid public purpose.
Some courts have held statutes similar to the one considered
in the foregoing case unconstitutional.3 5 If it appears that the
inhabitants of a town have no interest in the instituion as such
and no power of control over it, the incidental benefits resulting
to the people are not sufficient grounds for the exercise of the
taxing power to aid it.36 In Jenkins v. Andover3 7 taxation was
prohibited for the purpose of building a public school house,
which was founded by a charitable bequest but controlled by
trustees limited to members of a certain religions society,
although a majority of them were to be chosen by the inhabitants
of the town, and it was intended to use and occupy the building
in place of a high school. lThe objectionable feature was that
the school was not under the control of the public officials. For
that reason the court held that taxes could not be levied for
its support. Likewise industrial schools maintained by private
benevolent and charitable institutions deserve the patronage and
voluntary support of all citizens but the taxing power cannot
be used to support them when they are not under the control
of those who are taxed.
38
9. Conclusion.
A general view of the subject of education will find a few
prominent and outstanding principles. The first of these is that
the powers of taxation and eminent domain may be used to
establish and support a system of free public schools. These
powers may be exercised by the legal representatives of the
state or by the local subdivisions of the state. And local gov-
ernments may be required to establish and maintain public
schools as a part of the school system of the state.
The establishment and maintenance of schools include taxa-
tion for the transportation of children in consolidated school
districts because through centralization and unified work, better
-See for example, Curtis v. Whipple, (1869) 24 Wis. 350; Jenkins
v. Andover, (1869) 103 Mass. 94.
" Curtis v. Whipple, (1869) 24 Wis. 350. A statute was declared
unconstitutional which authorized taxation to erect a school building
for a private corporation.
(1869) 103 Mass. 94.
3St. Mary Industrial School v. Brown, (1876) 45 Md. 310.
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schools may be maintained at less expense. Separate schools
for colored pupils may also be maintained, provided the money
spent for the purpose is derived from taxes collected from
colored persons to be applied exclusively to the education of
their children. Likewise a tax to establish a teacher's pension
fund to encourage teachers to devote their lives to the teaching
profession is within the legitimate domain of public purpose.
And it appears that there is no objection to levying a special
tax, for example an income tax, for general school purposes.
But if the tax is used to benefit directly persons individually
by creating scholarships, the purpose is private and not public
in character.
In the second place, the higher institutions of learning have
been liberally supported by taxation and the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. Free high schools, mechanical and
agricultural colleges, as well as state universities, are examples.
Not only may these institutions be established and maintained,
but it is a legitimate exercise of the taxing power by a city to
devote money to secure their location, because of the resulting
benefits to local communities.
Finally, the exercise of these governmental powers in favor
of privately owned educational institutions in which the public
has no interest as such is not constitutional, unless the public
have a free and equal right to their benefits, and participate in
their control. In the absence of showing that this is true, taxa-
tion or condemnation of private property to aid them is for a
private and not a public purpose.
Jumrus R. BEU.
